

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

ROY HARNESS, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-791-DPJ-FKB

DELBERT HOSEMANN, SECRETARY OF STATE
OF MISSISSIPPI

DEFENDANT

CONSOLIDATED WITH

DENNIS HOPKINS, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-188-DPJ-FKB

DELBERT HOSEMANN, SECRETARY OF STATE
OF MISSISSIPPI

DEFENDANT

ORDER

Plaintiffs seek an order restoring the voting rights of convicted felons in Mississippi. The parties have all moved for summary judgment, contending that there are no disputed facts. [63, 65, 66, 74]. As discussed more fully below, both the United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected Plaintiffs' pivotal legal arguments as to article XII, section 241 of the Mississippi Constitution. While those courts may be free to reassess their prior rulings, the precedent is binding at the district-court level. For that and other reasons, Plaintiffs' motions [65, 74] are denied and Defendant's motions [63, 66] are granted as to disenfranchisement under section 241. As to section 253, which restores the right to vote, the Court finds the relevant motions [65, 66] should be denied.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Two groups of convicted felons filed separate suits seeking to regain the right to vote. The lead plaintiffs in those cases were Roy Harness and Dennis Hopkins. The Court consolidated the cases on June 28, 2018, and then certified a class action on February 26, 2019.

Plaintiffs challenge two sections of article XII of the Mississippi Constitution—sections 241 and 253. Section 241 provides that individuals who have been “convicted of murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement[,] or bigamy” are ineligible to vote. And section 253 allows the legislature to restore an individual’s suffrage by “a two-thirds vote of both houses, of all members elected.”

The Harness Plaintiffs focus their complaint on section 241, arguing that it violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because the disenfranchisement ;

argue that it violates both the First Amendment, by hampering political expression, and the Equal Protection Clause, because it is arbitrary and was enacted with discriminatory intent. *Id.*

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Each party seeks summary judgment. That relief is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” *Id.* at 323. The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” *Id.* at 324 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” *Little v. Liquid Air Corp.*, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” *Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.*, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. *TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash.*, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); *Little*, 37 F.3d at 1075; *SEC v. Recile*, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993).

III. Article III Standing and Eleventh Amendment Immunity

In his motions for summary judgment, Hosemann first raises concerns over Article III standing and Eleventh Amendment immunity. Under both approaches, Hosemann questions his connection to sections 241 and 253. As to section 241, he insists that local election officials have the duty and authority to register, refuse, and purge voters. And as to section 253, he maintains that ~~only~~ the]

enforce the statute’ and [is] threatening to exercise that duty.” *Okpalobi v. Foster*, 244 F.3d 405, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. at 157, 158). With these standards in mind, the Court considers sections 241 and 253 separately.

B. Section 241

Hosemann says he does not enforce section 241, does not investigate or prosecute violations of election laws, does not supervise local election officials, lacks the authority to prohibit felons from registering to vote, and has no duty to remove felons from the voter rolls. Def.’s Mem. [64] at 6. But Plaintiffs argue that Hosemann’s responsibilities under state law—particularly the administration of the computerized Statewide Elections Management System (“SEMS”)—and his designation as the state’s chief election officer under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”) provide enough basis for Article III standing and trigger the *Ex parte Young* exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Under state statute, “[t]he circuit clerk of each county is authorized and directed to prepare and keep in his or her office a full and complete list . . . of persons convicted of voter fraud or of any crime listed in Section 241, Mississippi Constitution of 1890.” Miss. Code § 23-15-151. But the statute goes on to provide that a list of persons convicted of a disenfranchising crime “shall also be entered into [SEMS] on a quarterly basis.” *Id.* SEMS is maintained by the Secretary of State and is consider

© ! e Ñ s cm

convicted of a disenfranchisi

delegate voter registration responsibilities to county officials”), *rev’d on other grounds*, 732 F.3d 382; *see also United States v. Missouri*, 535 F.3d 844, 846 n.1 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that the Missouri Secretary of State was the proper party to be sued under the NVRA even though enforcement power was delegated to local officials); *Madera v. Detzner*, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (noting the Secretary of State was Florida’s chief election officer and “[t]his statutory job description is not window dressing”).³

Based on these duties, Plaintiffs’ injuries are sufficiently traceable to and redressable by Hosemann to establish Article III standing. While he may not be the only step in disenfranchising a voter, he certainly plays a crucial role in the process. *Compare K.P. v. LeBlanc*, 627 F.3d 115, 123 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding redressability was met even though the defendant was “far from the sole participant in the application of the challenged statute”), *with Okpalobi*, 244 F.3d at 427 (finding no standing where the state officers did not have “*any duty or ability to do anything*” in connection with the law at issue (emphasis added)).

Likewise, for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Hosemann has “some connection” with enforcement of section 241, particularly in his role as chief election officer and administrator of SEMS. *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. at 157; *see Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan*, 499 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying immunity in action challenging voter disqualification as “incapacitated” and noting that while local election officials had authority to register voters, the Secretary of State was charged with providing local officials of individuals deemed incapacitated); *Libertarian Party of Ky. v. Grimes*, 164 F. Supp. 3d 945, 950 (E.D. Ky. 2016) (finding *Ex parte Young* exception applied where Secretary of State provided training to

³ Hosemann also serves on the three-person State Board of Election Commissioners alongside the Governor and the Attorney General. Miss. Code § 23-15-211(1).

county clerks and therefore had “some control over the perpetuation of the ballot access regime the [p]laintiffs challenge[d]”).⁴

C. Section 253

Section 253 presents a much closer question. It provides: “The Legislature may, by a two-thirds vote of both houses, of all members elected, restore the right of suffrage to any person disqualified by reason of crime; but the reasons therefor shall be spread upon the journals, and

the voting rolls after he or she successfully files a section 253 petition. Though somewhat distinguishable, the Fifth Circuit faced a similar question in *OCA-Greater Houston*, holding:

unlike in *Okpalobi*, where the defendants had no “enforcement connection with the challenged statute,” the Texas Secretary of State is the chief election officer of the state and is instructed by statute to obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of this code and of the election laws outside this code. We are satisfied that OCA has met its burden under *Lujan* to show that its injury is fairly traceable to and redressable by the defendants.

867 F.3d at 613–14 (quoting *Okpalobi*, 244 F.3d at 427 n.5) (additional quotation marks and footnotes omitted). To be sure, Hosemann’s role in section 253 is slight, but he does have “some connection with the enforcement of the act’ in question.” *Morris v. Livingston*, 739 F.3d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Okpalobi*, 244 F.3d at 414–15). The Hopkins Plaintiffs have minimally demonstrated standing and a basis for an

(Miss. 1950); H. Con. R. 5 (Miss. 1968). Finally, a majority of the voters had to approve the entire provision, including the revision. Because Mississippi's procedure resulted both in 1950 and in 1968 in a re-enactment of § 241, each amendment superseded the previous provision and removed the discriminatory taint associated with the original version.

157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit concluded that these amendments fell within the exception *Hunter* “left open,” *id.* at 391, and therefore “*Hunter* does not condemn § 241,” *id.* at 392.

As discussed next, the Harness Plaintiffs urge the Court to ignore *Cotton* because—according to them—it was based on an incomplete record, was wrongly decided, and has been at least tacitly overruled by the United States Supreme Court.

1. The Record Evidence

According to the Harness Plaintiffs, the *pro se* plaintiffs in *Cotton* were ill-equipped to create a record regarding the votes in 1950 and 1968, so the Fifth Circuit failed to consider a complete picture. Pls.’ Mem. [82] at 14. They suggest, for instance, that the Fifth Circuit did not see the ballot language in 1950 and 1968. *Id.* As a result, Plaintiffs say the court failed to consider that neither the legislature nor the electorate were allowed to “vote[] on whether to retain or remove the other crimes on the 1890 list. Thus, the voters in 1950 and 1968 did not have to approve the entire list of disenfranchising crimes in Section 241 and were not given the option to do so.” *Id.* at 13.

This argument goes only so far. True enough, the ballot language was not in the *Cotton* appellate record. But neither the *Cotton* plaintiffs nor the state mentioned the 1950 and 1968 votes in their appellate briefs. *See* Pls.’ Mem. [75] at 12–13. Instead, the Fifth Circuit raised those re-enactments *sua sponte*. And the only way the Fifth Circuit would have been aware of

ADOPTED BY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: March 25, 1968.

ADOPTED BY SENATE: March 25, 1968.

For Amendment()

Against Amendment()

1968 Ballot [74-8] at 1.

This language mirrors the Fifth Circuit’s description of the ballots. As quoted more fully above, the court recognized that “a majority of the voters had to approve *the entire provision, including the revision.*” *Cotton*, 157 F.3d at 391 (emphasis added). There is simply no hint that the court mistakenly believed voters did anything other than vote up or down on “the entire provision.” *Id.* Nor does it appear that the court thought voters were asked to “vote[] on whether to retain or remove the other crimes on the 1890 list.” Pls.’ Mem. [82] at 13. Finally, the fact that the ballot language did not allow individual

P

M

MM

“a g

Although the Fifth Circuit did not mention this well-known history in *Cotton*, the court was persuaded by the fact that both amendments made changes tha

15. Succinctly stated, they believe the events in 1950 and 1968 failed to remove the discriminatory intent that existed in 1890 because the votes merely amended section 241 and did not re-enact it. *Id.*

In *Perez*, the plaintiffs argued that *Hunter* placed the burden on Texas to prove its interim redistricting plan was not discriminatory. The Supreme Court rejected that argument noting that *Hunter* “addressed a very different situation.” *Perez*, 138 S. Ct. at 2325. But in doing so, the Court offered the following synopsis of *Hunter*:

Hunter involved an equal protection challenge to an article of the Alabama Constitution adopted in 1901 at a constitutional convention avowedly dedicated to the establishment of white supremacy. The article disenfranchised anyone convicted of any crime on a long list that included many minor offenses. The court below found that the article had been adopted with discriminatory intent, and this Court accepted that conclusion. The article was never repealed, but over the years, the list of disqualifying offenses had been pruned, and the State argued that what remained was facially constitutional. This Court rejected that argument because the *amendments* did not alter the intent with which the article, including the parts that remained, had been adopted. *But the Court specifically declined to address the question whether the then-existing version would have been valid if “[re]enacted today*

Alabama’s disenfranchisement laws, it was not attempting to distinguish between voluntary amendments and re-enactments because there were no voluntary amendments in *Hunter*. 138 S. Ct. at 2325. Instead, the so-called “amendments” occurred when the offending Alabama statutes were “struck down by the courts.” *Hunter*, 471 U.S. at 233. Significantly, *Cotton* references this very distinction when declining to follow *Hunter*. As the Fifth Circuit noted, “the voters of Mississippi willingly broadened [section] 241 through the constitutional amendment process” which made those changes “fundamentally different” from the judicial pruning that occurred in *Hunter*. *Cotton*, 157 F.3d at 391 n.8 (characterizing alterations by judicial process as “involuntary’ amendments”). And because *Perez* does not “directly conflict[]” with *Cotton*, *Cotton* still controls at the district-court level. *Alvarez v. City of Brownsville*, 904 F.3d 38

th Fi

Significantly, the Task Force expressly considered criminal disenfranchisement and whether to expand the list of crimes, amend section 241, or leave the law “as is.” *Id.* at 212

official action.” *Kirksey v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Hinds Cty.*, 554 F.2d 139, 148 (5th Cir. 1977). The unrebutted history shows the state would have passed section 241 as is without racial motivation. Finally, Plaintiffs cite no authority suggesting that a statewide vote—as opposed to this thorough

equal-protection guarantee. *Id.* The Supreme Court of California agreed, *id.* at 33–34, but the United States Supreme Court reversed. As the high Court noted, § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment acknowledges a state’s right to exclude convicted felons from the franchise, *id.* at 55–56.

Section 2 provides a penalty when a state denies or abridges the right to vote. Edited for clarity, the section provides:

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State . . . , or in any way abridged, *except for participation in rebellion, or*

state may deny the franchise to that group of ‘convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles.’” *Shepherd v. Trevino*, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting *Richardson*, 418 U.S. at 56).

That holding remains binding. And as the Fifth Circuit stated in *Cotton*, “Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit states from disenfranchising convicted felons.” 157 F.3d at 391 (citing *Richardson*, 418 U.S. at 24, 54). Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See *Valenti v. Lawson*, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing *Richardson* and stating “it is well established that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives states the ‘affirmative sanction’ to exclude felons from the franchise”); *Hand v. Scott*, 888 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting the Supreme Court “has held that ‘the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment’” (quoting *Richardson*, 418 U.S. at 54)); *Hayden v. Pataki*, 449 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has ruled that, as a result of [§ 2], felon disenfranchisement provisions are presumptively constitutional.”); *Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla.*, 405 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005) (listing cases, including *Richardson*, recognizing “the propriety of excluding felons from the franchise”); *Harvey v. Brewer*, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (“That is, once a felon is properly disenfranchised a state is at liberty to keep him in that status indefinitely and never revisit that determination.” (citing *Richardson*, 418 U.S. at 26–27)). Based on *Richardson* and *Cotton*, the Court must reject Plaintiffs’ argument.⁶

⁶ Plaintiffs apparently anticipated this holding. See Pls.’ Mem. [73] at 43 (stating that if Court finds *Richardson* applicable, “Plaintiffs present these arguments to preserve the issue for appeal”).

2. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Hopkins Plaintiffs also s

V. Section 253

As noted earlier, section 253 provides a legislative process by which a convicted felon can regain the right to vote. Under that provision, “[t]he Legislature may, by a two-thirds vote of both houses, of all members elected, restore the right of suffrage to any person disqualified by reason of crime.” Miss. Const. art. XII, § 253.

The Hopkins Plaintiffs make three primary arguments for invalidating section 253: (1) it violates the First Amendment because legislators have unfettered discretion to prevent speech; (2) it violates equal protection because it includes no objective standards for determining who is entitled to relief; and (3) it was adopted for racist reasons and therefore violates equal protection as proscribed in *Hunter*. The Court will address each argument.

A. First Amendment

“[T]he First Amendment provides no greater protection for voting rights than is otherwise found in the Fourteenth Amendment.” *Hand*, 888 F.3d at 1211; *see also id.* at 1212 (“Every First Amendment challenge to a discretionary vote-restoration regime we’ve found has been summarily rebuffed.”). The Court therefore dismisses the First Amendment claim.⁸

⁸ Plaintiffs cite *Hand* to support their First Amendment claim, asserting “[t]he Eleventh Circuit expressly recognized that ‘a discretionary felon-reenfranchisement scheme that was facially or intentionally designed to discriminate . . . might violate the First Amendment.’” Pls.’ Mem. [78] at 18 (quoting *Hand*, 888 F.3d at 1211–12). But what Plaintiffs left out of that sentence makes all the difference. The court was addressing schemes “designed to discriminate *based on viewpoint—say, for example, by barring Democrats.*” *Hand*, 888 F.3d at 1211 (emphasis added to language deleted from Plaintiffs’ memorandum). Plaintiffs’ use of an ellipses is at best suspect, and they never acknowledge that the *Hand* court rejected their argument. While *Hand* is not binding, it is persuasive.

B. Arbitrary Re-enfranchisement

Plaintiffs are correct that section 253 provides no “objective standards.” Pls.’ Mem. [73] at 44. Instead, the provision allows the legislature to consider petitions on a case-by-case basis, which Plaintiffs attack on two grounds. First, they say “the Fifth Circuit has twice instructed that arbitrary disenfranchisement or re-enfranchisement of individuals convicted of disenfranchising offenses violates the Equal Protection Clause.” Pls.’ Mem. [73] at 43–44 (citing *Williams v. Taylor*, 677 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1982); *Shepherd*, 575 F.2d 1110). But neither case actually addresses a [Os. sm982] De-enfrual O F the &, t M zatM y th C `

selective and arbitrary enforcement of the disenfranchisement procedure.” *Id.* at 517. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit held tha

Secretary of State has not shown section 253 is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Pls.' Mem. [78] at 46. To begin with, it is not enough for Plaintiffs to say the state failed to demonstrate a rational basis when it is Plaintiffs' burden to make that showing. *Nat'l*

favorable to the non-movant on each cross motion, which produces questions of fact on whether Plaintiffs met their burden under *Hunter*.

That said, Hosemann also argues that the Task Force and legislative processes in the mid-1980s satisfy the third prong of the *Hunter* analysis as to section 253. Unlike section 241, the legislature did not pass any laws that impacted section 253. Re-enfranchisement was, however, considered. Primarily, both the House and Senate committees jointly recommended eliminating section 253 and allowing convicted felons to regain the right to vote after completing their sentences and probation. *See* Def.'s Evidentiary Submissions [63-2] at 239–41 (Election Law Reform Study Committee Recommendations). But by the time S.B. 2234 was filed, that recommendation was absent. *Id.* at 255 (Proposed House Amendment to Senate Bill No. 2334). The Court could not find in this record what happened to the suggested amendment or whether it was ever voted on by either chamber.

Hosemann does not suggest that these facts trigger the *Cotton* analysis. As for *Hunter*, the Hopkins Plaintiffs say that absent re-enactment, the Court must limit its review to what happened in 1890. Even assuming the evidence from the 1980s impacts Hosemann's final burden under *Hunter*, the record is not sufficient to hold—as a matter of law—that either party is entitled summary judgment on that factual issue. Moreover, both parties offer conflicting evidence as to the intent in 1890. Again, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, which precludes summary judgment as to original intent for enacting section 253.

VI. Conclusion

The parties presented extensi

of these or the other issues would materially impact the trial of this matter, and the Court also wishes to avoid piecemeal appeals. For these reasons, all issues are certified.

Finally, the Court anticipates an appeal and therefore stays the Hopkins case until the appeal is concluded or the parties indicate that no appeal will be filed and request pre-trial conference.

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 7th day of August, 2019.

s/ Daniel P. Jordan III

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE